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Abstract
This paper assesses the limitations that the Stability and Growth Pact has imposed on Italy’s 
economic recovery and its debt reduction. By evaluating Germany’s fiscal policy since 1997, the 
paper  offers recommendations  for the Italian authorities.  Measures put forward by European 
Union institutions are hampering Italy’s economic recovery and evidence indicates that fiscal 
consolidation is ineffective in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. A balanced-budget fiscal injection 
seems the only way for Italy to escape from economic slump without further violations of the 
SGP. The paper concludes that the Pact needs to be reformed, or replaced by a central fiscal 
authority. (JEL E62, E63)
I. Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a global financial and economic crisis. The lack 
of  available  capital  together  with  the  imbalances  in  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU) 
member countries’ current account component of their balance of payments led to the EMU debt 
crisis in 2009-10. Whereas the German economy has emerged from the EMU debt crisis quite 
strong, the Italian economy has not experienced a similar pattern of recovery (Lane 2012, p. 50). 
Hence, for this paper, Germany is used as a model for considering Italy’s policy options. The 
paper evaluates the economic performance of the German and Italian economies in the context of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by focusing on their ability to meet the SGP criteria. It 
argues  that  in  order  to  reduce  its  debt-to-GDP ratio,  Italy  must  pursue  policies  aiming  to 
stimulate  growth  before  undertaking  long-term  structural  reforms.  A balanced-budget  fiscal 
expansion may be the only policy for a country to achieve growth within the SGP rules.
The rest of the paper is presented as follows. In Section II, the literature review explains the 
rationale of the SGP and provides a background to the German and Italian economies. Sections 
III and IV assess the two countries’ performance in the EMU and during the Euro-zone crisis; 
Section V compares Italy with Germany; Section VI assesses the policy options and proposes a 
course  of  action  for  Italian  and  EMU policymakers;  finally,  the  conclusion  summarizes  the 
paper’s findings.
II. Literature Review
The  SGP is  a  European  Union  (EU)  rule-based  framework  that  attempts  to  ensure  fiscal 
sustainability through an early warning mechanism and with potential sanctions for Euro-zone 
countries only (De Grauwe 2012; Eijffinger & De Haan 2008). It stipulates that government 
deficits should not exceed three per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and total government 
debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP. If national debt exceeds 50 per cent of GDP, then 
governments should necessarily register deficits below three per cent of GDP. The growth in 
government expenditure must not outpace growth in gross national product and, where member 
states do not comply with the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), multilateral sanctions up to 0.5 
per cent of GDP may be imposed (European Union 1997, articles 121, 126, 136 and Protocol 
12). Since the global financial crisis and the subsequent EMU debt crisis, only the debt and 
deficit thresholds remain relevant. The SGP was reformed in 2005 to take into account the effects 
of cyclical fluctuations on budget positions.  In 2011 the SGP was reformed again to strengthen 
its  surveillance  and  enforcement  capabilities  as  it  did  not  provide  enough  discipline  to  the 
member states (Lane 2012, p. 62). However,  neither the debt nor the deficit thresholds were 
changed, and still remain a sclerotic aspect of EMU. 
In the run-up to EMU, many potential risks of monetary union surfaced, such as member states  
adopting a loose fiscal policy (Eijffinger & De Haan 2008). With access to a much larger capital  
market and lower interest rates governments could potentially engage in reckless borrowing and 
spending. Such policies could cause two negative externalities. First, moral hazard, if creditor 
states are forced to tighten their fiscal policies in response to overspending by debtor states. 
Second,  spill-over  effects,  if  one  state  faces  a  debt  crisis  (Eijffinger  & De Haan 2008;  De 
Grauwe 2012). Furthermore, unsustainable sovereign debt risked causing price instability, which 
could hinder the functioning of the European Central Bank (ECB) whose mandate is to maintain 
EMU-wide inflation at a rate below but close to two per cent (Collignon 2004). A fiscal and a 
banking union would complete EMU; but a central fiscal authority remains politically elusive, 
due to state sovereignty and subsidiarity. The SGP was established to prevent these externalities, 
but was designed to leave the member states’ fiscal autonomy intact: a balance very difficult to 
strike.
Despite  implementing different economic policies,  the German and Italian economies shared 
similar patterns following the creation of the EMU, on 1 January 1999. The challenges faced by 
each country during the EMU debt crisis were different but Germany’s resilience reinforced its 
role as a model European economy. Thus, despite apparent differences between the Italian and 
German  economies,  European  institutions  pointed  to  the  German  model  when  proposing 
solutions to Italy’s debt crisis. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the two economies 
to assess the effectiveness of such proposals. The comparison is made possible by a number of 
similarities  between  the  two  economies.  For  example,  they  rank  as  first  and  third  largest 
economies in the EMU in terms of GDP (World Bank 2013). They both maintain large global 
trading sectors, with a substantial share of intra-EU trade and high volumes of bilateral trade. 
Each country has great regional disparities: in Germany the former Soviet, Eastern part of the 
country still lags considerably in relation to the Western regions of the country whereas Italy is 
characterised by an underperforming South. Both experienced the lowest average growth rates of 
all Euro-zone countries in the first half of the 2000s (EC 2006) and both were in violation of the 
SGP from 2001 to 2005. However, Germany performed much better than Italy since the onset of 
the global financial  crisis. Germany’s debt rarely exceeded 60 per cent of GDP before 2008 
whereas Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 100 per cent since the early 1990s, and it has never 
met the 60 per cent debt-to-GDP criterion (Lane 2012, p. 51).
Throughout the first half of the 2000s, both countries’ competitiveness declined significantly. For 
Germany, this was partly due to the lingering costs of unification, but also because it joined the 
Euro at an overvalued exchange rate (EC 2006). For Italy, this was largely because it could no 
longer rely on devaluation to regain competitiveness losses. German authorities engaged in a 
series of labour market  and other  structural reforms – which improved competitiveness,  and 
arguably allowed its labour force to remain relatively robust during the economic downturn of 
2007-09. On the other hand, no such policies were put in place or at least rendered effective in 
Italy. Consequently, Germany is now one of the world’s largest exporters of vehicles, machinery 
and chemicals (OECD 2011), with a relatively price-inelastic product specialisation. Conversely, 
in  the  past  decade,  Italian  exports  declined  as  its  product  specialisation  came  into  direct 
competition with Asian economies (EC 2012b).
Major  obstacles  to  growth in  both  countries  during  the  early 2000s were stagnant  domestic 
demand, structural rigidities and low productivity growth – in the case of Germany, stagnation 
was accompanied by a major rise in  unemployment (Figure 4).  The extended period of low 
growth led to structural unemployment in Germany and declining growth for both Germany and 
Italy. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, both economies rebounded, although Italy’s recovery 
has been much more modest than Germany’s.
 
III. Germany and the SGP
Germany is often regarded as a fiscally prudent economy, but was amongst the first states to be 
subjected to  the EDP after  violating  the  three per  cent  deficit-to-GDP threshold:  Germany’s 
deficit exceeded three per cent of GDP every year between 2001 and 2006, and its debt ratio 
remained  in  excess  of  the  SGP threshold  since  2002  (Figures  1  and  2).  According  to  the 
European  Commission  (EC)  (2006),  these  consecutive  deficits  were  largely  due  to  over-
projections of GDP, which remained at just over one per cent during that period. Sluggish growth 
led to lower tax revenues making it difficult to reduce deficits. However, as evident in Figure 3, 
the expenditure ratio increased between 2000 and 2003 whereas the revenue ratio was reduced or 
virtually  unchanged  even  after  Germany’s  economic  recovery.  Germany  therefore  failed  to 
comply with the EDP in 2005, but was not punished with sanctions. Whilst violating the SGP, 
Germany had the fiscal flexibility to boost its GDP growth. 
Figure 1 
Net lending (+)/Net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
  
Underscoring Germany’s low growth potential in the first half of the 2000s were its sluggish 
domestic consumption and its high unemployment; unemployment reached one of its highest 
post-war levels at 11.5 per cent (Figure 4). However, following a series of structural reforms 
between 2003 and 2005, the unemployment rate declined. These reforms, popularly known as the 
‘Hartz reforms’,  attempted  to  increase  labour  flexibility  and  improve  productivity  and 
competitiveness  (Burda  2007).  After  2005,  GDP began to  increase  and the  country’s  public 
finances recovered. The budget deficit of 2004 became a moderate surplus by 2007, and the debt-
to-GDP ratio declined. However, the global financial crisis resulted in deterioration of German 
public finances and the excessive deficits of 2009 and 2010.
Figure 2 
Government gross consolidated debt (% of GDP) 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
Since 2008, GDP fell sharply for Germany and its trading partners. Due to Germany’s reliance 
on trade and its specialisation in investment goods, the downturn in global investment caused 
one  of  the  sharpest  declines  in  GDP of  the  world’s  industrialised  economies  (EC  2009). 
However, well-functioning automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal expansionary policies 
helped boost economic growth. In addition, after three years of budget surpluses prior to 2009, 
Germany’s public finances did not suffer as much as some of its EMU partners. During the crisis 
the German government adopted measures including capital injections and guarantees to stabilise 
the faltering banking sector (EC 2009; OECD 2011). Although this added to deficits in 2009 and 
2010, the combined effect of these measures had a positive effect on GDP and resulted in a 
strong recovery from the crisis
Figure 3
Expenditure and revenue (% of GDP) – Germany 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
After successive deficits in the first half of the 2000s, Germany’s debt ratio passed the SGP 
threshold and reached 67 per cent of GDP in 2006 Q4. However, due to changes in German 
exports, domestic demand began to improve and its GDP growth started outperforming the Euro-
zone average (EC 2009). As a result, debt as a percentage of GDP declined but then increased 
sharply during the global financial crisis. Largely due to negative cyclical conditions (EC 2011), 
German debt-to-GDP increased by 10.6 per cent between 2008 Q3 and 2009 Q4. On the other 
hand, the sharp increase in the debt ratio between the third and fourth quarters of 2010 is almost 
entirely due to the government’s purchase of ‘bad assets’ from the banking sector (EC 2011). 
Germany’s budget balance and GDP growth since 2007 (Figure 5) show a striking resilience to 
the global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro-zone crisis. German GDP fell more than most 
other Euro-zone economies in 2009, but growth recovered almost immediately and has since 
outperformed the Euro-zone average. The 2010 deficit at 4.1 per cent of GDP (Figure 1) was 
reduced to a deficit of 0.8 per cent of GDP a year later, whilst the debt ratio has stabilised. 
Figure 4
Harmonised unemployment rate 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
Figure 5
GDP growth, Index 2005 Q1=100 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
The largest contributing factor to Germany’s economic recovery is its export growth. Figure 6 
shows that GDP growth has a very strong positive association with exports as a percentage of 
GDP (there may be a bidirectional causality between GDP growth and exports; determining such 
a relation is beyond the scope of this paper). Although its increased reliance on trade to boost 
GDP  growth  predisposed  Germany  to  the  downturn  in  global  demand,  it  is  also  what 
characterises its current stability and resilience to the Euro-zone crisis. Figure 8 helps clarify 
how the composition of Germany’s exports boosted its recovery. Both intra-EU and extra-EU 
trade  in  goods  followed upward  trends until  2007.  Between 2002 and 2007 there  was  little 
improvement  in  the  balance  of  Germany’s  extra-EU  trade  but  during  the  same  period,  the 
balance of intra-EU trade became the main component of Germany’s total trade surplus. At the 
trough of European economic activity in 2009, German intra-EU trade balance deteriorated to its 
pre-2002 level.  Yet  despite  the  ensuing Euro-zone crisis,  the  German economy was  able  to 
recover through an improved external trade balance (EC 2010). With external trade accounting 
for approximately 74 per cent of Germany’s trade surplus, there has been a clear shift. When 
intra-EU trade waned, Germany was able to access Asian markets to maintain GDP growth; this 
diversity explains, in part, Germany’s ability to remain resilient in the ensuing crisis. 
Figure 6
GDP and exports (% of GDP) – Germany 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
The primary reason for sluggish private consumption in Germany between 1997 and 2006 was 
the fact that real disposable incomes were virtually unchanged. This wage moderation led to 
major improvements in cost competitiveness (Burda 2007).  German labour  markets  arguably 
became much more flexible as a result of the ‘Hartz’ reforms, which allowed the economy to 
absorb shocks without major losses in employment (Burda 2007). Germany’s economic policies 
since 1997 demonstrate considerable sacrifices whilst other EMU members enjoyed protracted 
periods of growth and prosperity. Although this reflects foresight by German policymakers, it 
must be emphasised that these reforms were made possible by deviating from the SGP criteria. 
This leeway allowed Germany to engage in fiscal stimulus and enact a series of reforms which 
helped develop a robust economy and enabled a strong recovery from the global financial crisis.
IV. Italy and the SGP
Italy suffered chronic and extremely high debt-to-GDP ratios, currently at 130 per cent of GDP 
and likely to continue rising. Efforts to reduce the debt ratio between 2000 Q2 and 2004 Q4 
(Figure 2) did not have a lasting effect, and in recent years have seen sharp increases. The Italian 
government has maintained a primary surplus ever since joining the EMU with the exception of 
2009 (Figure 7); Italy has been one of the best performing Euro-zone economies in terms of its 
primary balance. Even though the primary balance deteriorated considerably between 2000 and 
2005 (according to EC 2006), this was the result of over-projections of GDP rather than loose 
fiscal policy. Despite a prudent fiscal stance, Italy’s debt ratio increased by 15 per cent since the 
establishment of the SGP.
Figure 7
Debt components – Italy 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
Figure 1 demonstrates that between 2001 and 2006, Italy’s budget deficit consistently exceeds 
three per cent of GDP. Under the EDP, Italy reduced its deficit to below three per cent in 2007. 
Following the global financial crisis, it rose in 2009 to its highest level since 1996 at 5.4 per cent  
of GDP. The cause for these deficits, and hence the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, is the 
government’s vast interest expenditure on past debt and not fiscal recklessness (Figure 7). The 
deficits  are caused by interest  repayments on debt,  which lead to further debt accumulation. 
Excessive  debt  is  both  the  cause  and  the  symptom  of  Italy’s  persistent  deficits.  Figure  7 
illustrates that in each year, the interest payments exceed the primary surpluses (the difference 
between  the  two  comprises  the  total  budget  deficit,  which  is  added  to  the  debt  burden). 
Moreover, with average GDP growth of 0.7 per cent since joining EMU (Figure 5), it has been 
near impossible for Italy to escape this vicious circle.
Currently,  any deficit  spending will  put  Italy in  violation of  the  SGP and may expose  it  to  
sanctions; making it even harder to meet the SGP criteria. In 2009, Italy’s annual GDP fell by 5.5 
per cent. With already poor public finances, Italy’s ability to engage in fiscal stimulus was and 
remains  severely restricted  by the  SGP (Buti  & Carnot  2013).  Declining  nominal  GDP and 
subsequent deficit spending between 2008 and 2009 caused an increase in the Italian debt ratio 
of almost 14 per cent (EC 2012c), and the primary balance went into deficit for the first time 
since 1990. However, tax reforms led to increased revenue and pushed the primary balance into 
surplus,  despite  a  declining  GDP  (EC  2012b),  indicating  a  notable  effort  by  the  Italian 
authorities. Nevertheless, the debt ratio continues to rise even as the primary balance improves. 
In its current pace, and based on the current EMU GDP forecasts, fiscal consolidation will most 
likely remain ineffective in reducing the debt ratio. 
V. Comparative Analysis
Germany’s budget balance and GDP growth since 2007 (Figure 5) shows a striking resilience to 
the global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro-zone crisis. German GDP fell more than most 
other Euro-zone economies in 2009, but growth recovered almost immediately and has since 
outperformed the Euro-zone average. The 2010 deficit at 4.1 per cent of GDP (Figure 1) was 
reduced to a deficit of 0.8 per cent of GDP a year later, whilst the debt ratio has stabilised. The 
largest contributing factor to this recovery is its export growth. Figure 6 shows that GDP growth 
has a very strong positive association with exports as a percentage of GDP (there may be a 
bidirectional causality between GDP growth and exports; determining such a relation is beyond 
the  scope  of  this  paper).  Although  its  increased  reliance  on  trade  to  boost  GDP  growth 
predisposed Germany to the downturn in global demand, it is also what characterises its current 
stability and resilience to the Euro-zone crisis. 
Figure 8
Trade balance of goods 
Source: Data from the European Commission, AMECO (2014)
Figure 8 helps clarify how the composition of Germany’s exports boosted its recovery.  Both 
intra-EU and extra-EU trade in goods followed upward trends until 2007. Between 2002 and 
2007 there was little improvement in the balance of Germany’s extra-EU trade but during the 
same period, the balance of intra-EU trade became the main component of Germany’s total trade 
surplus. At the trough of European economic activity in 2009, German intra-EU trade balance 
deteriorated to its pre-2002 level. Yet despite the ensuing Euro-zone crisis, the German economy 
was able to recover through an improved external trade balance (EC 2010). With external trade 
accounting for approximately 74 per cent of Germany’s trade surplus, there has been a clear 
shift. When intra-EU trade waned, Germany was able to access Asian markets to maintain GDP 
growth; this diversity explains Germany’s ability to remain resilient in the ensuing crisis. Thus, 
one of the biggest differences between the two countries is the geographical destination of their 
exports.  Germany has covered its  loss of intra-EU trade by accessing Asian markets.  Italy’s 
exports, on the other hand, suffered from a decade of exposure to the German market (its largest 
trading partner),  which experienced almost  a  decade of stagnant  demand for imports.  Italy’s 
inability to access Asian markets partly explains the decline in its trade balance (Figure 8). 
In  addition,  real  effective exchange rates in  Figure 10 show that  Germany experienced vast 
improvements in competitiveness since 1998 Q1, whereas Italy lost competitiveness. Germany’s 
improvements in cost competitiveness are primarily due to the fact that between 1997 and 2006 
real  disposable  incomes  were  virtually  unchanged  (Burda  2007).  German  labour  markets 
arguably became much more  flexible  as  a  result  of  the  ‘Hartz’ reforms,  which  allowed the 
economy  to  absorb  shocks  without  major  losses  in  employment  (Burda  2007).  Germany’s 
economic policies since 1997 demonstrate considerable sacrifices whilst other EMU members 
enjoyed protracted periods of growth and prosperity. Although this reflects foresight by German 
policymakers, it must be emphasised that these reforms were made possible by deviating from 
the SGP criteria. This leeway allowed Germany to engage in fiscal stimulus and enact a series of 
reforms which helped develop a robust economy and enabled a strong recovery from the global 
financial crisis. 
Italy’s poor export growth is characterised by a highly price-elastic product specialisation, losing 
a large part of its market share to price-competitive emerging economies (EC 2012b). Italy’s 
current situation is reminiscent of Germany in the first half of the 2000s: Italy would benefit 
from structural  reforms  to  improve  productivity  and  price-competitiveness,  as  Germany did 
(Burda 2007). However, although such structural reforms have medium to long-term benefits, 
they have short-term costs; structural efforts to improve competitiveness must be preceded by 
efforts to improve growth. 
VI. Policy options
A number of arguments have been made in favour of continued fiscal consolidation for countries 
suffering Italy’s symptoms (van Riet et al. 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff 2010; Merkel 2013; Rehn 
2013).  Fiscal  consolidation  may  be  compatible  with  GDP  growth,  if  uncertainty  over 
sustainability  of  public  finances  depresses  consumption  and  investment  and  hence  growth 
(Giavazzi & Pagano 1990; Afonso 2006; van Riet  et al.  2010; Giudice, Turrini & in ’t Veld 
2003). Yet there is little evidence of this being the case in Italy, whose debt is only a medium to 
long-run concern (EC 2012c). Moreover, with unemployment at almost double the March 2007 
rate, domestic uncertainty is unlikely to be centred on government debt.
Another argument in favour of fiscal consolidation is that failure to reduce debt will  lead to 
credibility losses and higher borrowing costs. This can be self-fulfilling, if higher borrowing 
costs lead to uncertainty over the sustainability of government finances (van Riet et al. 2010). In 
response, financial markets add a default risk premium on Italian sovereign bonds, which can 
raise  the  debt  ratio  (Figure  9).  However,  Paul  De  Grauwe  and  Yuemei  Ji  (2012)  found 
compelling evidence that bond spreads are not correlated with the debt ratio in the Euro-zone 
post-2008. Instead,  they found that Euro-zone bond spreads increase as the result  of ‘panic-
driven  collective  behaviour’ rather  than  poor  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  Their  findings 
highlight the need for a fiscal union, or at  least a banking union, rather than improving any 
country’s  fundamentals  –  with  the  exception  of  Greece.  The  ECB  ‘Outright  Monetary 
Transactions’ (OMT) policy, for all its effectiveness, does not provide a long-term solution. 
Although the Italian spread increased considerably towards the end of 2011 (Figure 9), there is 
little  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  reflects  unsustainable  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  The 
relationship between Italy’s debt ratio and borrowing costs is complex; factors such as fear of 
contagion and political instability must be taken into account. As illustrated in Figure 9, Italian 
spreads  increased  sharply  after  May  2011,  and  peaked  in  November  2011  as  the  Italian 
government  credit  rating  was  downgraded  (Milne  2011),  spreading  fears  of  a  self-fulfilling 
liquidity crisis. Rates then declined as Mario Monti became Italian Prime Minister; whilst this 
decline might be attributed to Monti’s commitment to fiscal consolidation, it is more likely that  
financial markets responded to the newfound political stability (Krugman 2013). Shortly after the 
political deadlock of spring 2013, general elections led to a further downgrade of Italy’s credit 
rating (Moody’s 2013; Landini 2013) – although macroeconomic fundamentals  such as slow 
growth and rising unemployment were also contributing factors. Increasing Italian bond yields 
resulted  in  upward  pressure  on  private  borrowing  costs,  and  constrained  private  sector 
investment; hence, weighing heavily on Italy’s future growth potential. Arguably, the only thing 
that staved off a liquidity crisis before accession of the next Prime Minister, Enrico Letta, is the 
ECB’s  OMT  policy  (Buti  &  Carnot  2013;  De  Grauwe  &  Ji  2013).  Letta  had  made  no 
commitments to austerity when he took office (Mackenzie 2013); but long-term interest rates 
continued to decline. 
Figure 9
10-year government bond yields 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
As bond yields  continue  towards  their  pre-crisis  level,  it  becomes  apparent  that  they –  and 
consequently  the  debt  ratio  –  respond  less  to  austerity,  and  more  to  political  and  regional 
stability. Italian political debates prior to the spring 2013 elections were centred on the Euro-
zone crisis  and the prospect of fiscal cuts,  which highlights an important  relationship: fiscal 
consolidation polarises opinions  and leads  to  political  instability.  In turn,  political  instability 
leads to a higher debt ratio and potential speculative attacks. Italy would benefit from reducing 
its debt ratio but, given the current political and economic climate, severe fiscal cuts are highly 
unlikely to achieve this. 
If fiscal consolidation is unlikely to reduce Italy’s debt ratio in the short term, an alternative 
approach is for the Italian government to spend more and to raise taxes by the same amount. 
This balanced budget approach is a compromise between radical Keynesian action and austerity 
currently required in Italy by the SGP.  There is considerable evidence that a balanced budget 
fiscal injection could help Italy recover from recession through the multiplier effect (Blanchard 
& Leigh 2013; DeLong & Summers 2012; Griffith-Jones & Jolly 2013; Hatzinikolaou 2013). As 
argued by some (Blanchard, Amighini & Giavazzi 2010, p. 54), only after economic activity has 
recovered should Italy attempt to reduce its  long-term debt.  By restoring growth, the Italian 
government will have more space for the implementation of much-needed structural reforms that 
will help reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium term. The ECB’s recent considerations of 
engaging in quantitative easing is supporting the existing downward trend of the 10-year Italian 
bond yield, as it seems capable of preventing the emergence of deflation in the Italian economy. 
This will allow further leeway for Italy to engage in a balanced budget fiscal stimulus.   
The effectiveness of fiscal policy will  be determined by the size of the fiscal multiplier.  An 
increasing number of studies indicate that multipliers are higher during recessions (Corsetti et al. 
2010;  Auerbach  &  Gorodnichenko  2011;  Blanchard  &  Leigh  2013);  thus,  if  the  Italian 
government follows a balanced budget policy, the effect will be equivalent to a fiscal stimulus. 
Furthermore,  a large multiplier  implies  that fiscal  consolidation is  likely to  be ineffective or 
indeed dangerous. A balanced budget in Italy is therefore likely to stimulate growth – and reduce 
the debt ratio as a result; whereas fiscal consolidation risks pushing Italy into a deep recession. 
Therefore the EC’s current emphasis on fiscal consolidation (EC 2006; EC 2011; EC 2012c) 
might cause a deterioration in Italy’s debt ratio by further depressing growth, and also risks 
causing  structural  unemployment  and  permanent  long-term  loss  in  potential  output  growth 
(DeLong & Summers 2012).  As Italian unemployment increases (Figure 4), a balanced-budget 
fiscal stimulus may be the only way to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. To that extent, the SGP 
considerably  restricts  Italy’s  ability  to  scale  down  its  debt  ratio,  prolongs  instability,  and 
endangers the future of the Euro-zone.
The response to the sovereign debt crisis aggravated asymmetries in the Euro-zone. The gap 
between the German growth-rate, and that of Italy and of the Euro-zone in general (Figure 5), 
has widened considerably since 2008. Whereas Italian borrowing costs have risen, German rates 
have  decreased  – reflecting  the  low risk  premium on German bonds,  and indicating  capital 
transfers from Italy to Germany. Having stabilised its debt, Germany can now afford to run a 
deficit within the SGP threshold, and use part of the deficit for Euro-zone fiscal transfers (De 
Grauwe & Ji 2013). Whilst this is likely to be effective, political realities remain major obstacles 
to  solving  the  crisis.  Yet,  growing asymmetries  of  the  Euro-zone require  a  system of  fiscal 
transfers, or a system of debt mutualisation – designed for members suffering Italy’s symptoms. 
At the very least, a banking union is necessary to prevent a repeat of the Euro-zone crisis (Lane 
2012, p. 63). If the Euro-zone fails to act decisively, this is likely to lead to fewer options and 
greater political sacrifices in the future.
Figure 10
Real effective exchange rates, Index 2005Q1=100 
Source: Data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2014)
VII. Conclusion
The SGP is a mechanism for maintaining fiscal prudence, which allows the ECB to focus on 
maintaining price stability in EMU. In that respect, the SGP could bring the benefits of fiscal 
union without the associated externalities. Evidence reported in this paper shows that the EMU 
debt crisis is widening the asymmetries between Italy and Germany, which are likely to be part 
of  a  broader  pattern  between  the  centre  and  periphery  of  the  EU.  Different  structural 
compositions in different countries (e.g. being prone to different types of shocks), means that a 
one-size-fits-all fiscal rule might be harmful in some countries.
This paper focuses on Italy and Germany: especially the slow or non-existent recovery in Italy 
since the global 2008 crisis. There is no evidence in this paper to suggest Italy is unique – hence 
if the SGP has been harmful to Italy, it is likely to be causing problems in other peripheral Euro-
zone  countries.  There  is  widespread  concern  among  economists  that  the  SGP is  preventing 
recovery in Europe. The SGP produced the opposite effects to what it was intended to achieve: it 
restricted governments’ ability to use fiscal policy,  without providing the benefits  of a fiscal 
union. Adherence to the SGP is self-defeating for Italy, which (like Germany in the mid-2000s) 
needs to stimulate growth before engaging in fiscal consolidation. The effects of a future shock 
on the Italian economy will be severe if the current institutional framework remains in place. If 
Italy were allowed to follow Germany’s example (i.e. to break the SGP rules, in order to adopt 
appropriate economic policies), then a faster recovery would be expected.
To protect EMU against future crises, and deal with current and future asymmetries, evidence in 
this paper suggests the EU should make radical changes to the SGP – or abandon it in, favour of 
closer fiscal integration.
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